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June 1965] l' ARSONS V. BRISTOL DEVELOPMENT Co. 861 
(113 C.2d 861; 44 Cal.Rptr. 767. 402 P.2d 8391 
[L. A. No. 27434. In Bank. June 17, 1965.] 
CEJAY PARSONS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRISTOL 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et aI., Defendants and 
Respondents. 
[1] Contracts-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-The inter-
pretation of a written instrument, even though it involves 
what might properly be called questions of fact, is essentially 
a judicial function tc be exercised according to the generally 
accepted ca:::lOns of interpretation so that the purposes of the 
instrument may be given effect. 
12] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence.-Extrinsic evidence is admissi-
ble to interpret a written instrument, but not to give it a 
meaning to T."hich it is not reasonably susceptible, and it is the 
instrument itself that must be given effect. 
[S] Contra.ct&-Interpretation-Functions of Courts-Evidence to 
Aid Construction.-It is solely a judicial function to interpret 
a written instrument unless the interpretation turns on thll 
credibility of extrinsic evidence. 
[4] Id.-Interpretation-Functions of Courts-Evidence to Aid 
Construction.-An appellate court is not bound by a construc-
tion of a contract based solely on the terms of the written 
instrument with'Out the aid of evidence, where there is no 
conflict in the evidence, or a determination has been made on 
incompetent evidence. (Disapproving language in Estate of 
Rule, 25 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319] to the 
·e1fect that an appellate court must accept a trial court's inter-
pretation of a written instrument when "conflicting inferences 
lIlay be drawn" from extrinsic evidence, and language invoking 
Estate of Rule in E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, 54 Cal.2d 
91,94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Faus v. Pacific Electric 
Ry. Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 370, 375 [303 P.2d 814]; Overton v. 
Vita-Food Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370 [210 P.2d 757]; also 
disapproving a similar statement concerning conflicting infer-
ences from uncontroverted evidence in Estate of Jones, 55 
Cal.2d 531, 538 [11 Cal.Rptr. 574, 360 P.2d 70).) 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 119; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 240 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 255; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st 
ed §l091). 
HcX. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 160; [2] Evidence, § 327; 
[3-5] Contracts, § 161(9); [6, 11) Architects, § 9; [7) Contracts, 
§ 183; [8] Contracts, § 156; [9] Contracts, § 243; [10] Estoppel, 
§ 35. 
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862 PARSONS V. BRISTOL DEVELOPMENT CO. [62 C.2d 
[6] Id.-Interpretation-Functions of Oourts-Evidence to Aid . 
Oonstruction.-Statements that even in the absence of extrinsic 
evidence the trial court's interpretation of a written instrument 
must be accepted by an appellate court if such construction 
is reasonable, or if it is one of two or more reasonable con-
structions of the instrument, or if it is equally tenable with 
the appellate court's interpretation, are proper if they are 
interpreted to mean only that an appellate court must deter-
mine that the trial court's interpretation is erroneous before 
it may properly reverse a judgment; they do not mean that 
the appellate court is absolved of its duty to interpret the 
instrument. 
[6] Architects-Oompensation.-Under a contract for an archi-
tect's services containing several subdivisions pertaining to 
payment of the architect's fee and providing in one such sub-
division that payment would be made only from construction 
loan funds, the builder's failure to obtain satisfactory financing 
arrangements for the project released it from any obligation 
to pay the architect any more than the 25 per cent of his full 
fee that he had already received under the contract where the 
construction loan condition was not limited to the payment 
provision in the contract subdivision in which it appeared but 
applied to all subdivisions relating to payment of the archi-
tect's fee, since the parties contemplated payment over and 
above 25 per cent of the architect's full fee only on commence-
ment of construction and the evidence showed that the archi-
tect knew the builder's ability to undertake construction turned 
on availability of loan funds. 
[7] Oontracts - Interpretation - Oonditions. - When payinent of 
money is to be made from a specific fund, and not otherwise, 
the failure of such fund will defeat the right of recovery. 
[8] Id.-Interpretation-Terms lmplied.-Each party to a con-
tract has a duty to do what the contract presupposes he will 
do to accomplish its purpose. 
[9] Id.-Breaeh-Prevention of Performance.-A party who pre-
vents fulfillment of a condition of his own obligation under a 
contract cannot rely on such eondition to defeat his liability. 
[10] Estoppel- Equitable Estoppel- Operation. - In an action 
against a builder by an architect to recover the balance of his 
fee allegedly due under a contract for his services, the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel was not available to the architect so as 
to deny the builder the right to invoke a condition of the con-
tract that payment to the architect would be made only from 
construction loan funds where, at the time the architect chO!;e 
to proceed with his work on the project, the builder did not 
[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Architects, § 11; Am.Jur.2d, Architects, 
§ 12 et seq. 
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represent that construction loan funds had been ()btained and 
the architect did not reasonably rely on the existence of such 
funds. . 
[11] Architect&-Compensation.-In an action to recover the bal-
ance of an architect's fee allegedly due under a contract con-
ditioning payment of such compensation on the obtaining of 
construction loan funds by the builder, no breach of the 
builder's duty to notify the architect when it became clear 
that construction loan funds could not be obtained appeared 
where the architect did not show that he failed to receive such 
notice, and where, even assuming that he had no notice, he did 
not prove the extent to which he suffered damages by con-
tinuing to work after he should have received notice. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Samuel Dreizen, Judge. Affirmed. 
. Action to recover for services rendered by an architect and 
to foreclose a mechanic'8 lien. Judgment for defendants af-
firmed. 
Floyd H. Norris as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
Felix H. McGinnis for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Launer, Chaffee & Hanna, Daniel L. Stack, Miller, Nisson, 
Kogler & Wenke and Clark Miller for Defendants and Re-
spondents. 
C. Douglas Wikle, Walter Atkinson, W. Alan Thody, Dell 
L. Falls, Cooper & Boller, Rowland, Paras & Clowdus and 
Gloyd T. Clowdus as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants 
and R.espondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In December 1960 defendant Bristol 
Development Company entered into a written contract with 
plaintiff engaging him as an architect to design an office 
building for a lot in Santa Ana and to assist in supervising 
construction. Plaintiff's services were to be performed in 
two phases. He completed phase one, drafting preliminary 
1>lans and specifications, on January 20, 1961, and Bristol 
paid him $600. 
The dispute concerns Bristol's obligation to pay plaintiff 
under phase two of the contract. The contract provided that 
"a condition precedent to any duty or obligation on the part 
) 
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of the OWNER [Bristol] to commence, continue or complete;l 
Phase 2 or to pay ARCHITECT any fee therefor, shall be the 
obtaining of economically satisfactory financing arrange-
ments which will enable OWNER, in its sole judgment, to 
construct the project at a cost which in the absolute decision I 
of the OWNER shall be economically feasible." It further ' 
provided that when Bristol notified plaintiff to proceed with 
phase two it should pay him an estimated 25 per cent of his 
fee, and that it would be obligated to pay the remaining 75 
per cent "only from construction loan funds." 
Using plaintiff's preliminary plans and specifications, 
--Bristol obtained from a contractor an estimate of $1,020,850 
as the cost of construction, including the architect's fee of 
6 per cent. On the basis of this estimate, it received at: offer 
from a savings and loan company for a construction loan 
upon condition that it show clear title to the Santa Ana lot 
aud execute a first trust deed in favor of the loan company. 
Shortly after obtaining this offer from the loan company, 
Bristol wrote plaintiff on March 14, 1961, to proceed under 
phase two of the contract. In accordance with the contract, 
Bristol paid plaintiff $12,000,' an estimated 25 per cent of 
his total fee. Thereafter, plaintiff began to draft final plans 
and specifications for the building. 
Bristol, however, was compelled to abandon the project 
'because it was unable to show clear title to the Santa Ana 
lot and thus meet the requirements for obtaining a construe-
·.lion loan. Bristol's title became subject to dispute on May 
23, 1961, when defendant James Freeman 1iled an action 
against Bristol claiming an adverse title.1 On August 15, 
1961, Bristol notified plaintiff to stop work on the project. 
. Plaintiff brought an action against Bristol and Freeman 
to recover for services performed under the contract and 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on the Santa Ana lot. The trial 
court, sitting without a jury, found that Bristol's obligation 
to make further payment under the contract was conditioned 
upon the existence of construction loan funds. On the ground 
that this condition to plaintiff's right to further payment 
was not satisfied, the court entered judgment for defendants. 
Plaintiff appeals. 
The trial court properly admitted evidence extrinsic to 
the written instrument to determine the circumstances under 
IFreeman had previously conveyed the Santa Ana lot to Bristol on 
October 1, 1960, with the understanding that Bristol would construct an 
office building upon the lot and pay Freeman an annuity. 
" ...... -...... -~.-
\ 
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wlJich the parties contracted and the purpose of the contract. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1860; Civ. Code, § 1647; see Corbin, Tke 
In'crpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 
Cornell L.Q. 161.) There is no con:flict in that evidence. 
llristol contends, however, that an appellate court is com-
)wlled to accept any reasonable interpretation of a written 
jUKtrument adopted by a trial court whether or not extrinsic 
('vidence has been introduced to interpret the instrument 
11IId whether or not that evidence, if any, is in conflict. We 
do not agree with this contention. 
Since there has been confusion concerning the rules for 
~l))pellate review of the interpretation of written instruments 
(lice Es~ate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 843,352 [131 P.2d 825] [con-
(lurring opinion]; Estate of 8hannon, 231 Cal.App.2d 886, 
889-890 [42 CalRptr. 278]), it is appropriate here to define 
111e scope of such review. 
[1] The interpretation of a written instrument, even 
though it involves what might properly be called questions 
or fact (see Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 
202.204), is essentially a judicial function to be exercised 
according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation 
"0 that the purposes of the hlstrument may be given effect. (See 
Civ. Code, §§ 1635-1661; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856.1866.) 
[S] Extrinsic evidence is "admissible to interpret the in-
. 6trument, but not to give it a meaning to. which it is not 
reasonably susceptible" (Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 
2d 311, 315 [38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265]; Nofziger v. 
Il0Zman, 61 Cal.2d 526, 528 [39 Cal.Rptr. 384, 393 P.2d 696]; 
Imbach v. Schultz, 58 Cal.2d 858, 860 [27 Cal.Rptr. 160, 
377 P.2d 272]), and it is the instrument itself 'that must 
be given effect. (Civ. Code, §§ 1638, 1639; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1856.) [3] It is therefore solely a judicial function to 
interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation 
turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. [4] Ac-
cordingly, "An appellate court is not bound by a construc-
tion of the contract based solely upon the terms of the 
written instrument without the aid of evidence [citations], 
'where there is no conflict in the evidence [citations], or a 
tlctermination has been made upon incompetent evidence 
[citation]." (Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 
825]. Accord, Moore v. Wood, 26 Cal.2d 621, 629-630 [160 
P.2d 772]; Western Coal &- Mining Co. v. Joncs, 27 Cal.2d 
819, 826-827 [167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685]; Estate of 
a c.x-a 
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Wu1iderle, 30 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [181 P.2d 874); Estate of 
Fleming, 31 Cal.2d 514, 523 [190 P.2d 611) ; Meyer v. State 
Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 381 [267 P.2d 257).)1 
[6] It is true that cases have said that even in the absence 
of extrinsic evidence the trial court's interpretation of a 
written instrument must be accepted "if such interpretation 
is reasonable, or if [it) is one of two or more reasonable con-
structions of the instrument" (Priekett v. Royal Ins. Co., 
56 Cal.2d 234, 237 [14 Cal.Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907, 86 A.L.R. 
2d 711) ; Lundin v. Hallmark Productions, Inc. 161 Cal.App. 
2d 698, 701 [327 P.2d 166), or if it is "equally tenable" with 
the appellate court's interpretation (Estate of Northcutt, 16 
Ca1.2d 683, 690 [107 P.2d 607); accord, Estate of Cuneo, 
60 Cal.2d 196, 201 [32 Cal.Rptr. 409, 384 P.2d 1]). Such 
statements are not in conflict with Estate of Platt, supra, 21 
Ca1.2d 343, if they are interpreted, as they should be, to mean 
only that an appellate court must determine that the trial 
court's interpretation is erroneous before it may properly 
reverse a judgment. (See Estate of Shannon, 231 Cal.App. 
2d 886, 893 [42 Cal.Rptr. 278).) They do not mean that 
the appellate court is absolved of its duty to interpret the 
instrument. 
Since there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence in the 
present case we must make an independent determination 
of the meaning of the contract . .After providing for payment 
of an estimated 25 per cent of plaintiff's fee upon written 
notice to proceed with phase two, paragraph 4 of the contract 
makes the following provisions for payment: 
SWe disapprove lanpage in Estate of Bule, 25 Cal.2d 1,11 [152 P.lld 
1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319J, to the effect that an appellate court must aeeept 
a trial court's interpretation of a written instrument when " con:6.ieting 
inferences may be drawn" from extrinsic evidence. The rule of Estate of 
Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825), and the eases applying it make 
it clear that it is only when eon:6.icting inferences arise from eon:6.icting 
evidence, not from uncontroverted evidence, that the trial court's resolu-
tion is binding. "The very possibility of ... conflicting inferences, actu· 
ally con:flicting interpretations, far from relieving the appellate court of 
the responsibility of interpretation, signalizes the necessity of its assum-
ing that responsibility." (Estate of Bule, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 17 [dis-
senting opinion].) Language in E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, 64 
Cal.2d 91, 94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Faus v. Pacific Eleotric 
By. Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 370, 375 [303 P.2d 814]; Overicm v. Vita-Food 
Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370 [210 P.2d 757], invoking Estate Of Bule, 
is likewise disapproved. A similar statement eoncernmg con:6.icting infer-
ences from uncontroverted evidence in EBtate of Jones, 55 Cal.2d 531, 638 
[11 Cal.Rptr. 574, 360 P.2d 70], is also disapproved. The eases cited in 
support of such a rule by tlle Jcmes ease did not involve the interpreta-
tion of written instruments. 
) 
') 
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"(a) ...• 
'.' (b) Upon completion of final working plans, specifica-
tions and engineering, or authorized commencement of con-
struction, whichever is later, a sum equal to SEVENTY-FIVE 
(75%) PER CENT of the fee for services in Phase 2, less all 
previous payments made on account of fee; provided, how-
ever, that this payment shall be made only from construction 
loan funds. 
"(c) The balance of the fee shall be paid in equal monthly 
. payments commencing with the first day of the month fol-
lowing payments as set forth in Paragraph 4(b); provided, 
however, that TEN (10%) PER CENT of the fee based upon 
the reasonable estimated cost of construction shall be with-
held until thirty (30) days after the Notice of Completion 
of the project has been filed. 
"(d) If any work designed or specified by the ARCHITECT 
is abandoned of [sic] suspended in whole or in part, the 
ARcmTECT is to be paid forthwith to the extent that his serv-
ices have been rendered under the preceding terms of this 
paragraph. Should such abandonment or suspension occur 
before the ARcHITECT has completed any particular phase of 
the work which entitles him to a partial paymcnt as afore-
said, the ARcHITECT'S fee shall be prorated based upon the 
percentage of the work completed under that particular 
phase and shall be payable forthwith." 
[8] Invoking the provision that "payment shall be made 
only from construction loan funds," Bristol contends that 
since such funds were not obtained it is obligated to pay 
plaintiff no more than he has already received under the 
contract. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he performed 
95 per cent of his work on phase two and is entitled to that 
portion of his fee under subdivision (d) of paragraph 4 less 
the previous payment he received. He contends that sub-
division Cd) is a "savings clause" designed to secure partial 
payment if, for any reason, including the lack of funds, the 
project was abandoned or suspended. Plaintiff would limit 
the construction loan condition to subdivision (b), for it 
provides "that this payment shall be made only from con-
struction loan funds" (emphasis added), whereas the other 
subdivisions are not expressly so conditioned. 
The construction loan condition, however, cannot reason-
ably be limited to subdh'ision (b), for subdivisions (c) anrl 
868 PARSONS 1). BRISTOL DEVELOPMENT CO. 
(d) both refer to the terms of subdivision (b) and must 
fore be interpreted with reference to those terms. Thus, 
"balance of the fee" payable "in equal monthly 
under subdivision (c) necessarily refers to the 
subdivisions of paragraph 4.8 In the absence of 
to the contrary, subdivision (d), upon which plaintiff relieS,. 
must likewise be interpreted to incorporate the construction 
loan condition (Civ. Code, § 1641), for it makes explicii 
reference to payment under preceding subdivisions by lan-
guagc such as "under the preceding terms" and "partial 
payment as aforesaid." Subdivision (d) merely provides ___ """". 
accelerated payment upon the happening of a 
It contemplates, however, that construction shall have 
for it provides for prorated payment upon the abando:wxleIllt. 
or suspension in whole or in part of "any work 
or specified by the Architect." Implicit in the scheme is 
purpose to provide, after initial payments, for a series of 
ments from construction loan funds, with accelerated na.vn~ell1: 
from such funds in the event that construction was au,a.Ll'""V.LI"'''' 
or suspended. Although plaintiff was guaranteed an ",,, •. .u.ua,,,,,,,,, 
25 per cent of his fee if the project was frustrated 
construction, further payment was contemplated only 
the commencement of construction. This int.PTTll',pt.A.t.in,n 
supported by evidence that plaintiff knew that Bristol's 
to undertake construction turned upon the availability of 
funds. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined 
that payments beyond an estimated 25 per cent of plainti1f~. 
fee for phase two were to be made only from 
loan funds. 
[7] When "payment of money is to be made from a 
cific fund, and not otherwise, the failure of such fund 
defeat the right of recovery." (Rains v. Arnett, 189 
App.2d 337, 347 [11 Cal.Rptr. 299].) Although there are, '. 
exceptions to this rule, plaintiff has neither alleged no~·. 
proved facts that entitle him to reCQver on the ground of anJ';: 
exception. . 
[8] Each party to a contract has a duty to do what the 
contract presupposes he will do to accomplish its purpose. 
(Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Ca1.2d 92, 99 [156 P.2d 757, 157 
A.L.R. 1277].) [9] Thus, "A party who prevents ful-' \ 
fillment of a condition of his own obligation ... cannot rely 
3,Althougll neither the amount of each monthly payment nor the nun.tber" 
of payments was specified, the amount and number could be determmcd 
from the time estimated to construct the building. 
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on such condition to defeat his liability." (Bewick v. Mecham, 
supra, 26 Ca1.2d at p. 99; Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey, 
15 Cal.2d 711, 717 [104 P.2d 641].) Plaintiff, however, has 
not shown that Bristol failed to make the proper and reason-
able efforts that were contemplated to secure the loan from 
which he was to be paid. (Cf. Rosenheim v. Howze, 179 Cal. 
309 [176 P. 456].) The risk that a loan might not be ob-
" mined even though Bristol acted properly and in good faith 
~""was a risk clearly anticipated even though the reason the 
loan failed may not have been foreseen. 
[10] Nor has plaintiff established grounds for applying 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny Bristol the right 
to invoke the construction loan condition. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1962, subd. 3.) If, by its letter of March 14, asking 
plaintiff to proceed with his work under phase two of the 
eontract, Bristol had induced plaintiff to believe that funds 
had been obtained, and if plaintiff had reasonably relied 
upon such representation, Bristol could not invoke the con-
dition to defeat its contractual liability. Reasonable reliance 
resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position is 
the essence of equitable estoppel, and therefore a compelling 
basis for preventing a party from invoking a condition that 
he represented as being satisfied. (See Crestline Mobile Homes 
Mfg. Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp., 54 Ca1.2d 773, 778-781 
[8 Cal.Rptr. 448, 356 P.2d 192] ; cf. Drennan v. Star Paving 
Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 414-415 [333 P.2d 757].) Bristol, how-
ever, did not represent that funds had been obtained, and 
plaintiff did not reasonably rely upon the existence of con-
struction loan funds when he undertook work under phase 
two of the contract. A representative of Bristol told plaintiff 
before he began phase two of his work that although Bristol 
would be able to pay plaintiff $12,000, an estimated 25 per 
cent of his fee, "they would not be able to proceed unless 
actual construction funds were obtained." Plaintiff, know-
ing that funds had not been obtained, nevertheless chose 
to proceed with his work on the project. 
[11] Finally, plaintiff has not shown that Bristol breached 
the duty to give him notice when it became clear that con-
struction funds could not be obtained. Without such funds 
the purpose of the contract would have been frustrated and 
plaintiff could not have been paid the balance of his fee. 
Plaintiff therefore would have been excused from performing 
80 long as there was a reasonable doubt as to his compensa-
tion. Whether or not such funds were obtained was a matter 
-........... -.. _. 
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peculiarly within Bristol's knowledge. Accordingly, 
had a duty to notifY plaintiff that the project was 'imlra .. ",ilAit 
when Freeman filed his action against Bristol on May 
for Bristol then knew or should have known that it 
be unable to obtain a loan. Plaintiff, however, has not 
that he failed to receive such notice, and even if it is 8Sl!IUDled 
that he had no notice, he did not prove the extent to which he· 
suffered damages by continuing to work after he should bve 
received notice. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mask,· 
and Burke, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 
1965. 
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